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Abstract—This paper proposes a method for deriving for-
mal specifications of systems. To accomplish this task we
pass through a non trivial number of steps, concepts and
tools where the first one, the most important, is the concept
of method itself, since we realized that computer science
has a proliferation of languages but very few methods. We
also propose the idea of Layered Fault Tolerant Specifica-
tion (LFTS) to make the method extensible to Dependable
Systems. The principle is layering the specification, for the
sake of clarity, in (at least) two different levels, the first one
for the normal behavior and the others (if more than one) for
the abnormal. The abnormal behavior is described in terms
of an Error Injector (EI) which represents a model of the
erroneous interference coming from the environment. This
structure has been inspired by the notion of idealized fault
tolerant component but the combination of LFTS and EI us-
ing rely guarantee thinking to describe interference can be
considered one of the main contributions of this work. The
progress toward this method and the way to layer specifica-
tions has been made experimenting on the Transportation
and the Automotive Case Studies of the DEPLOY project.
I. Introduction
Dubium Sapientiae initium - Descartes
There is a long tradition of approaching Requirements
Engineering (RE) by means of formal or semi-formal tech-
niques. Although ”fuzzy” human skills are involved in the
process of elicitation, analysis and specification - as in any
other human field - still methodology and formalisms can
play an important role [16]. The first thing we realized
in building dependable software is the necessity to build
dependable communication between parties that use dif-
ferent languages and vocabulary. In order for the systems
to match expectations (and specifications), we need indeed
a precise mapping between intentions and actions. Formal
methods appear to be an effective solution.
Object Oriented Design [7] and Component Comput-
ing [19] are just well known examples of how some rigor
and discipline can improve the final quality of software
artifacts besides the human communication factor. The
success of languages like Java or C# could be interpreted
in this sense, as natural target languages for this way of
structuring thinking and design. It is also true - and it is
worth reminding it - that in many cases it has been the
language and the available tools on the market that forced
designers to adopt object orientation principles, for exam-
ple, and not vice versa. This is the clear confirmation that
it is always a combination of conceptual and software tools
together that create the right environment for the success
of a discipline.
Semi formal notations like UML [11] helped in creating
a language that can be understood by both specialists and
non specialists, providing different views of the system that
can be negotiated between different stakeholders with dif-
ferent backgrounds. The power (and thus the limitation of
UML) is the absence of a formal semantics (many attempts
can be found in the literature anyway) and the strong com-
mitment on a way of reasoning and structuring problems
which is clearly the one disciplined by object orientation.
Many other formal/mathematical notations existed for a
long time for specifying and verifying systems like process
algebras (a short history by Jos Baeten in [5]) or specifi-
cation languages like Z (early description in [4]) and B [2].
The Vienna Development Method (VDM) is maybe one of
the first attempts to establish a Formal Method for the
development of computer systems [6]. All these notations
are very specific and can be understood only by special-
ists. The point about all these formalisms is that they are
indeed notations, formal or semi-formal. Behind each of
them there is a way of structuring thinking that does not
offer complete freedom and thus forces designers to adhere
to some discipline. But still they are not methods in the
proper sense, they are indeed languages.
The goal of this paper is providing a different view for
interpreting problems and faults. The overall result will be
the definition of a method for the specification of systems
that do not run in isolation but in the real, physical world.
To accomplish this task we need to pass through a non
trivial number of steps, concepts and tools where the first
one, the most important, is the concept of method itself,
since we realized that computer science has a prolifera-
tion of languages but very few methods. In the following
we want to put more emphasis on the difference between
methods and languages and, as a consequence, between
formal methods and formal languages.
II. About Methods and Languages
The idea of this section is defining a set of desiderata for
the method we will present later in this paper. We reached
these ideas partly in an attempt to understand what a
method basically is, and partly gaining experience and in-
sights by experimenting with the DEPLOY pilot projects
[1]. Firstly, we think it is important to distinguish between
the words method and methodology, often misused. For
the Websters dictionary ”a method is a way, technique, or
2process of or for doing something”. It is worth noting that
this definition depends on the one of process which is ”a
series of actions or operations conducing to an end”. The
word methodology can also be used to intend ”a particular
procedure” but the general meaning is ”the analysis of the
principles of methods [...] employed by a discipline”. Ac-
cording to these definitions, when we refer to Process Alge-
bras, for example, the words methodology and method are
not correct. Although in computer science it is common
practice to use the word formal methods to intend formal
languages, in this paper we will use the word method only
to intend the final result of a methodological study related
to a specific context, software systems specification in this
case.
To properly understand what a method is and what it is
not we explored an illustrious example by Descartes, the
”Discourse on the Method” (1637) [18]. It is the famous
philosophical and mathematical treatise which is the
source of the quotation ”Je pense, donc je suis” (”I think,
therefore I am”). For lack of space here it is not possible
to report all the relevant parts. We are only interested
in understanding how Descartes perceives a method and
what is peculiar in it. Looking at [18] it is easy to realize
that a method proposes a partially ordered set of actions
that need to be performed and then discharged within
a specific causal relationship. The success of one action
determines the following ones. More in detail, this study
suggested us that the method we are going to propose
needs to satisfy a number of properties. The first three
are taken directly from Descartes’ method, while the
last three are grabbed from our experiments with case
studies which we will partly introduce later but we think
it is worth to gather all the features together now. Our
understanding of the method of science has told us that:
1. It has to consist of steps to acquire knowledge
2. It has to be formally defined (”phases”, steps, work-
flow)
3. It has to be repeatable (by non formal methods
experts)
Then our practical experience has suggested that:
1. It has to be scalable (non ”ad hoc” - it has to work
outside specific case studies)
2. It needs abstractions (what and not how)
3. It has to be extensible to fault tolerant behavior (we
propose the idea of LFTS for this)
The above definitions and the ”Discourse on the
Method” are a starting point to understand better what
a method is and what it is not. At this point the dif-
ferences between a formal language and a formal method
should be clearer. Now we have to ask ourselves why we
need a method. The ”why” is an interesting point, it is a
meta question, a question that allows us to reason about
the method looking from outside the method. The logic
is what is done inside the system, in this case the for-
mal steps performed (in some order) to reach the desired
end i.e. the method itself. The reasoning is what is done
”outside the system”, experimenting and seeing what hap-
pens if we change the basic rules. Reasoning ”about the
method” gives us a way to find out the motivations lead-
ing to a method definition. What we believe now is that
the first step in building dependable software is building
dependable communication between parties that have dif-
ferent languages/vocabulary. According to the definition
of communication [10], formal methods in system specifica-
tion are tools to commit on dependability since they help
us in clarifying our vocabulary and providing a notation
able to build a precise mapping between intentions and
actions in the different stakeholders’ minds. Thus a clear
and precise definition of a formal method (in the actual
meaning of the word) seems to be necessary at this stage.
After having understood where we want to go and why,
now it is good practice to say how we want to get there.
III. Toward a Method
Our work in this paper focuses especially on [14] where
the original idea of a formal method for the specification
of systems running in the physical world originated. That
paper was full of interesting ideas but still was lacking of a
method in the sense we described so far. Few case studies
have been analyzed according to this philosophy in [8] but
still a complete method has not been reached. For this
reason now we think that a more structured approach is
urgent in this area. Thus, the goal of the present work
is to improve our understanding of those ideas, trying to
increment that contribution and to put it in an homoge-
neous and uniform way describing a method featuring the
properties we introduced above with particular attention
to dependable systems. At the moment we have had some
progress in this direction but we still need more work.
The basic idea behind [14] was to specify a system not in
isolation but considering the environment in which it is
going to run and deriving the final specification from a
wider system where assumptions have been understood
and formalized as layers of rely conditions (we will explain
this later in the paper). Here the difference between
assumptions and requirements is crucial, especially when
considering the proper fault tolerance aspects. We could
briefly summarize this philosophy as follows:
• Not specifying the digital system in isolation
• Deriving the specification starting from a wider system
in which physical phenomena are measurable
• Assumptions about the physical components can be
recorded as layers of rely-conditions (starting with
stronger assumptions and then weakening when faults
are considered)
This approach allows us to see a computer system
from a different angle, as not consisting of functions
performing tasks in isolation but as relationships (inter-
faces/contracts) in a wider world including both the ma-
chine and the physical (measurable) reality. This philos-
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ophy has been partly inspired by Michael Jackson’s ap-
proach to software requirements analysis typically called
Problem Frames approach [12]. The software running
on the hosting machine is called Silicon Package and it
should be clear that the machine itself can neither ac-
quire information on the reality around nor modify it. The
machine can only operate trough sensors and actuators.
To better understand this point, we like to use a similar
metaphor about humans where it is easier to realize that
our brain/mind system (our Silicon Package?) cannot ac-
quire information about the world but it can only do that
through eyes, ears and so on (our sensors). In the same
way it cannot modify the world if not through our arms,
voice, etc (our actuators). So, as we start describing prob-
lems in the real world in terms of what we perceive and
what we do (and not about our brain functioning) it makes
sense to adopt a similar philosophy for computer systems
consisting of sensors and actuators. Around the Silicon
Package we have the problem world and the assumptions
that need to be made regarding it. We want to derive the
specification of the Silicon Package starting from the wider
system. The way in which we record these assumptions is
a topic for the following sections.
A. The Method and its Steps
In this work we are structuring the method introduced
in [14] according to the properties described in the pre-
vious section. To do this behind that work we recognize
three main steps:
1. Define boundaries of the systems
2. Expose and record assumptions (by means of rely-
conditions)
3. Derive the specification
Our idea is to not commit to a single language/notation
- we want a formal method, not a formal language - so
we will define a general high level approach following these
guidelines and we will suggest, in the case study, reference
tools and notations to cope with these steps. It is impor-
tant to note that these are only reference tools that are
suggested to the designers because of a wider experience
regarding them from our side. A formal notation can be
the final product of the method but it still needs to be not
confused with the method itself. In this work we want to
emphasize the different steps that were not clearly defined
previously in [14]. The reader will understand that this
is still a simplification of the process. We use the word
”steps” instead of ”phases” since we do not want to sug-
gest a sort of linear process which is not always applicable,
in the average case (especially when coping with fault tol-
erance as we will discuss later). We imagine, in the general
case, many iterations between the different steps. The idea
of the method is to ground the view of the Silicon Package
in the external physical world. This is the problem world
where assumptions about the physical components outside
the computer itself have to be recorded. Only after this
can we derive the specification for the software that will
run inside the computer. This more precise formalization
of the method and the features the method has to exhibit
is one of the main contributions of this work.
B. Rely/Guarantee Thinking and Interference
We have already mentioned the Rely/Guarantee
thinking a number of times in this paper but to really
understand its power it is necessary to realize how
preconditions and postconditions can help in specifying a
software program when interference does not play a role.
What we have to describe (by means of logical formulas)
when following this approach is:
1. the input domain and the output range of the pro-
gram
2. the precondition, i.e. the predicate that we expect to
be true at the beginning of the execution
3. the postcondition, i.e. the predicate that will be
true at the end of the execution provided that the
precondition holds
Preconditions and postconditions represent a sort of
contracts between parties: provided that you (the envi-
ronment, the user, another system) can ensure the validity
of a certain condition, the implementation will modify
the state in such a way that another known condition
holds. We show the example of a very simple program,
the specification of which in the natural language may be:
Find the smallest element in a set of natural numbers
This very simple natural language sentence tells us
that the smallest element has to be found in a set of
natural numbers. So the output of our program has
necessarily to be a natural number. The input domain
and the output range of the program are then easy to
describe:
I/O : P(N)→ N
Now, the input is expected to be a set of natural numbers,
but in order to be able to compute the min such a set has
to be non empty since the min is not defined for empty
sets. So the preconditions that has to hold will be (please,
note the difference between P and P):
P (S) : S 6= ∅
Provided that the input is a set of natural numbers and it
is not empty, the implementation will be able to compute
the min element which is the one satisfying the following:
Q(S, r) : r ∈ S ∧ (∀e ∈ S)(r ≤ e)
Given this set of rules, the input-output relation is given
by the following predicate that needs to be satisfied by any
implementation f :
∀S ∈ P(N)(P (S)⇒ f(S) ∈ N ∧Q(S, f(S)))
Now, to better understand the limitations of these kind
of abstractions, consider the case of interference happening
4through a global state. Two processes alternate their exe-
cution and access to the state. The global state can consist
of shared variables or can be a queue of messages if mes-
sage passing is the paradigm adopted (at the end the two
paradigms are equivalent). This is exactly the situation de-
scribed in [13]. In the case in which we consider interfering
processes we need to accept that the environment can al-
ter the global state but the idea behind R/G is that we
impose these changes to be constrained. Any state change
made by the environment (other concurrent processes with
respect to the one we are considering) can be assumed to
satisfy a condition called R (rely) and the process under
analysis can change its state only in such a way that ob-
servations by other processes will consist of pairs of states
satisfying a condition G (guarantee). Thus, the process
relying on the fact that a given condition holds can guar-
antee another specific condition. Consider, for example,
the two following simple pieces of code, the cooperation of
which calculates the Greatest Common Divisor:
P1: P2:
while(a<>b){ while(a<>b){
if(a > b) if(b > a)
a := a-b; b := b-a;
} }
P1 is in charge of decrementing a and P2 of decrementing
b. When a= b will evaluate to true it means that one is the
Greatest Common Divisor for a and b. The specification
of the interactions is as follows:
R1 : (a = a)∧ (a≥ b⇒ b= b)∧ (GCD(a,b) =GCD(a,b))
G1 : (b= b)∧ (a ≤ b⇒ a= a)∧ (GCD(a,b) =GCD(a,b))
R2 =G1
G2 =R1
Here the values a and b are used instead of a and b when we
want to distinguish between the values before the execution
and the values after. P1 relies on the fact that P2 is not
changing the value of a and a ≥ b means no decrements
for b have been performed. Furthermore the GCD did not
change. Specular situation is for the guarantee condition.
Obviously, what is a guarantee for P1 becomes a rely for
P2 and vice versa.
IV. The Transportation Case Study
The ideas presented in this paper about the method and
the way to organize specifications derived by experiment-
ing with interesting case studies through the development
of the DEPLOY project [1]. We have mainly got experi-
ence from two studies: namely the Transportation and the
Automotive Case Studies (DEPLOY WP1 and WP2). In
this work we describe the first one of these studies and in
particular we will show how it brought us to a better def-
inition of the method. The case study is taken from [3],
the train system, where the goal was showing the power of
modeling and formal reasoning by means of Event-B exam-
ples. We chose this scenario since we believe it is particu-
larly realistic (it has been developed after some work with
real train systems) and still manageable (with a limited
set of initial requirements: 39). This case study taught us
how to distinguish between assumptions and requirements
and helped us in finding a better structure for the method
initially presented in [14]. We will show here how this
example can be approached with the three step method.
The first thing to do is deciding the bounds of specifi-
cation (step 1). We will then show how the boundaries
can be broadened to include the external world. In the
second step we will discuss how to separate assumptions
and requirements, how to expose and record assumptions
and how different sets of requirements and assumptions
will imply a different specification and then implementa-
tion. In the third step we will assume the existence of
an already designed network infrastructure (with sensors
etc...) to show a specific example of implementation. At
the end we will show how to make use of rely conditions
for this specific implementation. Unfortunately, because of
space constraints, it is not possible to present all the re-
quirements and the necessary background (the interested
reader can find all the details in [3]). What it is important
to realize is the way in which the interference over a global
state is considered using the approach showed in the small
GCD example. In the following, the specification will be
showed, after a discussion about the way in which it has
been obtained, and the interaction between the different
operations will be constrained in a similar way but in a
system with a potentially higher level of concurrency.
Step 1: defining the boundaries of the system
The idea here, as said, is to clarify the requirements in
the real world before trying to specify the software which
sits within the system. This process naturally identifies
assumptions about the physical components which can
be then recorded as rely-conditions. One of the main
principles of this approach is not specifying a system
in isolation but starting to move the system boundaries
outwards (what is called ”pushing out the boundaries of
the system” in [14]). What is the wider system in which
physical phenomena are measurable? What is the actual
general purpose of the Train System? We believe it is
allowing trains to move safely from a place X to a place Y.
How does this help us in identifying the system require-
ments? We can recognize that the FUN-1 requirement
of the system specification [3] expresses basically this need:
”The goal of the train system is to safely
control trains moving on a track network”
If we move the boundary outwards further we can say
that the purpose of the system is allowing people to reach
their destination safely. Considering this we could split
FUN-1 in two properties (without referring to any specific
implementation yet):
• Safety property: nothing bad can happen
• Liveness property: something good has to happen
We can express these two properties more in detail for
this example as follows:
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• Safety: Trains will never collide
• Liveness: Trains will move from their origin to their
destination
Req FUN-1 is general enough to allow this separa-
tion, anyway we are interested here in modeling only the
safety property delegating liveness to a scheduler or, the-
oretically, to a manual management performed by opera-
tors/engineers. For the sake of simplicity, the specifica-
tion will start with this requirement only. All the other
requirements presented in [3] refer to concepts like blocks,
routes and signals that can describe either a set of assump-
tions about the environment or a specific implementation
of FUN-1. We will say more about this later.
Step 2: exposing and recording assumptions
Now it is crucial to discriminate between requirements
for the system and assumptions about the real world. In
this example it was important to ask if we are in charge
of designing the whole railway/track with sensors, signals,
etc. or not. If not, many of the requirements (and the
given block structure showed later) can be considered as
assumptions taken from the already existing environment
(for example the ENV group of requirements in [3]).
Otherwise, they can be still seen as requirements but
referring to a specific implementation and they should not
be introduced now but only later, in the last step. For
example, the requirement ENV-13:
”A signal can be red or green. Trains
are supposed to stop at red signals”
is an example of how requirements and assumptions can
be (in our opinion erroneously) mixed in the same state-
ment. So determining the assumption (and being able to
separate them from requirements) is the main goal of this
step. In this example we suppose to be the designer of the
whole track and we want trains to move from city X to city
Y. There are many possible implementations for the pre-
sented requirements, we will look into the details of only
one (which is the one given in [3]). Before looking at that
it is easy to understand that the simplest possible imple-
mentation is the one requiring that no train can cross the
network. This is an implementation where the Safety prop-
erty is preserved (but Liveness is not). Although we are
interested mainly in this property here, a better thing to
do would be allowing only one train on the track between
X and Y. This means basically that the rail connecting
two cities will be reserved for a single train. Obviously
this implementation respects both the safety and liveness
requirements described above. But it is also easy to re-
alize that it is simply unfeasible because of the very low
efficiency, very low exploitation of the available resources
and because of the expensiveness (time and money).
A more reasonable implementation is actually the one
that in [3] is simply used for the modeling purposes. The
scope here is different from what has been done there,
for this reason we did not assume this implementation as
given but we wanted to go through the entire discussion.
The point was learning the lesson about determining
wider boundaries, including the external environment,
and distinguishing between requirements and assumptions.
So we analyzed the entire process carefully. Now we are
ready to present this implementation. Figure 1 represents
an example of the infrastructure. It is made of:
1. Blocks: a track is made of a number of fixed blocks
as showed in figure 1
2. Routes: blocks are always structured in a number
of statically predefined routes. Each route represents
a possible path that a train may follow. Routes de-
fine the various ways a train can cross the network.
A route is composed of a number of adjacent blocks
forming an ordered sequence. For example a route is
LABDKJN.
3. Points: a track contains these special components. A
point may have two positions: directed or diverted.
These components are attached to a given block. And
a block contains at most one special component. In
figure 1, B and D, for example, they both contain
points.
4. Signals: each route is protected by a signal
(Red/Green). It is situated just before the first block
of each route and it must be clearly visible by train
drivers. When a signal is red the corresponding route
cannot be used by an incoming train.
Fig. 1
The network infrastructure
The idea is to have each block of a reserved route freed
as soon as the train does not occupy it anymore. It is not
scope of this work to describe entirely the case study but
only to describe the insights we have gained in the process
of working toward a method. The reader who can find it
hard to abstract over few details should refer to [3] for the
detailed description of this scenario. In the next section we
will focus on the reserving routes system, i.e. the process
of reserving a route on a train request, freeing it and letting
the train occupy block by block freeing each block when
passed.
We have also decided to abstract over concepts like time
or distances since the underlying block-based infrastruc-
ture will ensure that we will never have two trains in the
6same block in such a way to avoid collisions. This ab-
straction simplifies our work without being in contradic-
tion with the original philosophy of grounding the system
in the physical world. We have only decided that the bor-
der between the system and the real world here will con-
sist of the sensors and actuators necessary to make such
an infrastructure working. We have also decided to focus
on safety purposes. We indeed do not cope with liveness,
we assume that these kind of problems are managed by
a scheduler which is another system already running. A
graph structure would be probably more adequate in case
we want to focus on the scheduler having Liveness coming
into play since in the present representation the network is
seen as a set of routes from which you cannot really infer
which one is adjacent to the other.
Step 3: deriving the formal specification
Now we define the basic machinery for the formal
specification. We need four finite sets for the purpose:
• T, a finite set of trains (t a variable ranging over it)
• B, a finite set of blocks (b a variable ranging over it)
• R, a finite set of routes (r a variable ranging over it)
• P, a finite set of points (p a variable ranging over it)
The safety requirement will be modeled as a total
function mapping blocks to trains: B→ T (train). This is
how we impose to have a single train on a block. To avoid
collisions by trains we also need a way to associate trains
to routes, once the train has reserved a specific route. We
use the function: T→ R (route). A route is then composed
by blocks, at least one: R→ B+ (blocks) and in a route
a block has a next element: B → B (next). Blocks can
be free or occupied : B → {free, occupied} (status)
and are associated to points: B → P (point)
that can be oriented in two different ways: P →
{directed,diverted} (direction). Routes can be available
or reserved: R → {available, reserved} (availability)
and each route is associated with a predefined points ori-
entation: R→ (P→ {directed, diverted}) (orientation).
We rely on the fact that the sensors with which a block
is equipped can always detect the presence of a train
(for B → T). We assume that if we want to reserve a
point, it will be promptly positioned. We do not model
these ”low level” aspects here (for T→ R). We rely also
on the fact that each route has a first block: R → B
(first), a last block: R→ B(last), and they are different:
first(R) 6= last(R).
The mathematical machinery defined so far can be con-
sidered part of the global state on which the five opera-
tions we are going to define operate: they are related to
the process of route reservation and freeing plus the en-
trance, proceeding and exit of a train to and from a route.
These are the operations concerned with the specification
of our safety requirement. Liveness is not discussed, we
only move a train from one end of a route to the other
without investigation about the way in which the routes
are previously organized. For each operation the notation
below indicates the data needed and what we expect from
that data plus the way in which the global state will be
modified.
Operation RouteReserving (t : T,r : R)
Rely availability(r) = available
∀ b ∈ blocks(r) (status(b) = free)
Guarantee availability(r) := reserved
∀ b ∈ blocks(r) (status(b) := occupied)
route(t) := r
∀ p ∈ P (direction(p) := orientation(r)(p))
Given a train and a route, this operation guarantees three
mappings to be properly updated, provided that the given
route is available and the related blocks are free. The three
mappings are first the one between points and directions,
second the one between trains and routes (as a record of
the overall track status) and last the association between
blocks and their occupancy status. These represent the
part of the global state of interest for this operation.
Operation RouteFreeing (t : T)
Rely ∀b ∈ blocks(route(t)) (status(b) = free)
Guarantee availability(route(t)) := available
route(t) := null
Given a train the related route is identified. The effect on
the state is a modification of the mapping where the train
is associated to the null route and, provided that all the
blocks in the route are free, the route itself can be freed.
This operation has a simpler definition with respect to the
reservation because the blocks are freed by the ExitRoute
while the points direction does not need to be modified
when freeing a route.
Operation EnterRoute (t : T)
Rely availability(route(t)) = reserved
∧ status(first(route(t))) = free
Guarantee status(first(route(t))) := occupied
This operation corresponds to a train entering the first
block of a route. The first block must be unoccupied before
the operation and it will be occupied afterward. It can be
accessed only by trains that have already reserved a route.
Operation MovingOnRoute (t : T,b : B)
Rely availability(route(t)) = reserved
∧ b ∈ blocks(route(t))
∧ status(next(b)) = free
Guarantee status(b) := free
status(next(b)) := occupied
This operation corresponds to the occupancy of a block
which is different from the first block of a reserved route.
It can be accessed only by trains that have already reserved
a route. The current block has to belong to the route and
the next one can be occupied only when it is free. The
occupation of the next block implies that the current one
becomes free.
Operation ExitRoute (t : T,b : B)
Rely availability(route(t)) = reserved
∧ b ∈ blocks(route(t))
∧ next(b) = ∅
Guarantee ∀b ∈ blocks(route(t)) status(b) := free
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This operation corresponds to the train exit out of the
route. It can be accessed only by trains that have already
reserved a route and it is responsible to free all the blocks
in that route.
V. Layered Fault Tolerant Specification
The previous sections discussed how to derive a specifi-
cation of a system looking at the physical world in which
it is going to run. No mention has been made of fault
tolerance and abnormal situations which deviate from the
basic specification. The first thing the reader will realize
is that the method we defined does not cope with these
issues but it does not prevent fault tolerance from playing
a role. The three steps simply represent what you have
to follow to specify a system and they do not depend
on what you are actually specifying. This allows us to
introduce more considerations and to apply the idea to a
wider class of systems. Usually in the formal specification
of sequential programs widening the precondition leads to
make a system more robust. The same can be done by
weakening rely conditions. For example, if eliminating a
precondition the system can still satisfy the requirements
this means we are in presence of a more robust system.
Here we intend to promote this approach combined with
the idea of fault as interference. Quoting [9]:
The essence [...] is to argue that faults can
be viewed as interference in the same way that
concurrent processes bring about changes beyond
the control of the process whose specification
and design are being considered.
In this work we introduce the idea of Layered Fault
Tolerant Specification (LFTS) combining it with the
approach quoted above and making use of rely/guarantee
thinking. The first step in this direction is defining a Fault
Model, i.e. which kind of abnormal situations we are
considering. Our specification will then take into account
that the software will run in an environment when specific
things can behave in an ”abnormal” way. There are three
main abnormal situations in which we can incur, they can
be considered in both the shared variables and message
passing paradigm:
• Deleting state update: ”lost messages”
• Duplicating state update: ”duplicated messages”
• Additional state update (malicious): ”fake messages
created”
The first one means that a message (or the update of
a shared variable) has been lost, i.e. its effect will not be
taken into account as if it never happened. The second
one regards a situation in which a message has been in-
tentionally sent once (or a variable update has been done
once) but the actual result is that it has been sent (or per-
formed) twice because of a faulty interference. The last
case is the malicious one, i.e. it has to be done inten-
tionally (by a human, it cannot happen only because of
hardware, middleware or software malfunctioning). In this
case a fake message (or update) is created from scratch
containing unwanted information.
In our approach the model of fault is represented by a
so called Error Injector (EI). The way in which we use
the word here is different with respect to other literature
where Fault Injector or similar are discussed. Here we
only mean a model of the erroneous behavior of the
environment. This behavior will be limited depending on
the number of abnormal cases we intend to consider and
the EI will always play its role respecting the defined R/G
rules. The operations will rely on a specific abnormal
behavior and, given that, will guarantee the ability to han-
dle these situations. More in detail, the rules are as follows:
• The Error Injector (environment) interferes changing
the global state but respecting his G for example,
only lost messages can be handled
• The operation relying on this kind of (restricted)
interference is able to handle exceptional/abnormal
(low frequency) situations satisfying a weaker G
All the possibilities of faults in the system are described
in these terms and the specification is organized according
to the LFTS principle, i.e layering the specification, for the
sake of clarity, in (at least) two different levels, the first
one for the normal behavior and the others (if more than
one) for the abnormal. This approach originated from the
notion of idealized fault tolerant component [15] but the
combination of LFTS and rely guarantee reasoning can be
considered one of the main contributions of this work. The
main motto for LFTS is: ”Do not put all in the normal
mode”. From the expressiveness point of view, a mono-
lithic specification can include all the aspects, both faulty
and non faulty, of a system in the same way as it is not
necessary to organize a program in functions, procedures
or classes. The matter here is pragmatics, we believe that
following the LFTS principles a specification can be more
understandable for all the stakeholders involved. We also
hope that, considering the Silicon Package in its relation-
ships with the physical world, could assist the process of
finding faulty behavior important to the system.
LFTS for the Train System
Here we consider the Train System in a less ideal world
than the one analyzed before. In this world, the EI plays
its role, for the sake of simplicity, changing the global
state only according to the ”lost messages” condition. The
global state of the system needs to be modified for the EI to
implement its changes. Now, in the network, sensors and
actuators can actually fail and some state update could be
not performed. Thus, let us modify the availability
function in such a way as to include a third option:
R→ {available, reserved,maintenance!} (availability).
The RouteReserving operation can be extended as follows:
8Operation RouteReserving (t : T,r : R)
Rely availability(r) = available
∀ b ∈ blocks(r) (status(b) = free)
Rely≈ availability(r) = available
Guarantee availability(r) := reserved
∀ b ∈ blocks(r) (status(b) := occupied)
route(t) := r
∀ p ∈ P (direction(p) := orientation(r)(p))
Guarantee≈ availability(r) :=maintenance!
∀ b ∈ blocks(r) (status(b) := occupied)
route(t) := null
This specification includes the case in which, although the
requested route is available, not all the related blocks have
been freed (for example in one block a sensor stopped work-
ing). This is a warning situation and the route needs to
be put under observation, the train will be assigned to a
null route and, for safety reasons, all the blocks in that
route will be occupied. An additional layer of R/G has
been added for this purpose and it has been indicated by
≈.
The ”make-it robust” process
The process of adding further layers to the specification
considering situations that are abnormal (in the sense that
they happen less frequently) is called ”make-it robust” pro-
cess and it will be fully developed and formalized as future
work. It is out of the scope of this paper to explain in detail
the formalism behind it, this work represents just an in-
troduction to the method with an explanation of the need
for it and its potential application to dependable systems.
Anyway, the idea we are working on is to modify the global
state, passing from what we call the Ideal World (the initial
layer) to what we call the Real World (the further layers,
it will never be ”real” anyway) according to specific for-
mal rules that have to be applied. In this way we restrict
the creative act behind the addition of new layers but we
make it possible to automatize the consistency check be-
tween different layers. Looking at the Polya’s analysis of
ancient Greeks problem solving [17], he divides mathemat-
ical problems into two classes: ”problems to prove” and
”problems to find”. We have been inspired by this anal-
ysis when working on this process. The idea is simply
applied: the creative act of identifying the next layer is
a ”problem to find” and it needs human intervention and
invention. This is the hard part of the work. This process
is formally guided by a number of rules explaining how the
global state, its mappings, the relative domains and ranges
and the R/G conditions have to be modified giving a sig-
nificant spectrum of possibilities, but not infinite freedom.
The easy part of the work will be then performed auto-
matically and it will be the ”prove” part, the consistency
check which represent the automatic correctness analysis.
VI. Achievements
In this paper we worked toward an improvement of the
ideas presented in [14]. The main contributions can be
considered:
1. An understanding of what a method is and an anal-
ysis of the desiderata
2. A formalization of the method in [14] and of the fea-
tures it has to exhibit
3. EI as a model of faults (and consequent introduction
of fault tolerant behavior)
4. The organization of the specification in terms of layers
of RG conditions (LFTS)
5. The experimentation on a practical case study
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